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A CHOICE OF LAW ANALYSIS OF EVIDENTIARY
PRIVILEGES
Years of work on the part of the Louisiana State Law Institute
recently culminated in the legislature's enactment of the Louisiana Code
of Evidence.' The Law Institute chose to present the new code to the
legislature in two parts. The first part, which is analogous to the existing
Federal Rules of Evidence, contains rules of general applicability con-
cerning judicial notice, 2 relevancy,3 witnesses, 4 opinions and expert tes-
timony,' hearsay,6 authentication, 7 and the contents of documents., The
Law Institute is currently working on the second part of the code, which
will contain the rules of privilege, burdens of proof, and presumptions. 9
Meanwhile, as part of the continuing revision of the civil code, a
separate committee of the Law Institute is drafting what will be the
first comprehensive codification of conflict of laws rules in the United
States.' 0 These articles are intended to replace the outmoded rules cur-
rently found in the civil code" with new rules that reflect modern thinking
in this field.' 2 The drafting process is nearing completion, and the
conflicts articles should be presented to the legislature during the 1990
regular session."
The fields of evidence and conflicts rarely overlap. Courts and
commentators traditionally considered evidence law "procedural" and
thus called for the exclusive application of forum law. '4The same result
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1. 1988 La. Acts No. 515, § 1.
2. La. Code Evid. arts. 201-202.
3. La. Code Evid. arts. 401-413.
4. La. Code Evid. arts. 601-615.
5. La. Code Evid. arts. 701-706.
6. La. Code Evid. arts. 801-806.
7. La. Code Evid. arts. 901-905.
8. La. Code Evid. arts. 1001-1008.
9. Force & Triche, The Current State of Evidentiary Privileges in Louisiana, 49 La.
L. Rev. 733 (1989).
10. For a description of the conflicts revision effort, see Symeonides, Exploring the
"Dismal Swamp": The Revision of Louisiana's Conflicts Law on Successions, 47 La. L.
Rev. 1029, 1033-35 (1987).
11. La. Civ. Code arts. 14-15.
12. Symeonides, supra note 10, at 1033-34.
13. Conversation with Prof. Symeon C. Symeonides, Reporter for the Conflicts Re-
vision (Feb. 27, 1989).
14. See, e.g., Bass v. Prewett, 225 La. 883, 886, 74 So. 2d 150, 151 (1954) ("[Ilt
is well settled that questions of evidence or procedure are governed by the law of the
forum."); Restatement of Conflict of Laws §§ 595-598 (1934).
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is reached under modern conflicts methodologies that call for analysis
of relevant state policies. 5 Sovereigns promulgate rules of admissibility
of evidence primarily to facilitate proof of facts in trials in their own
courts. Relevancy rules limit prejudice to parties and save time in the
courtroom, hearsay rules ensure the reliability of statements by out-of-
court declarants, and competency rules ensure that witnesses are capable
of testifying truthfully. Insofar as these rules bear solely on the fact-
finding process of the forum court, no other state has a legitimate
interest in the application of its rules to the exclusion of those of the
forum.
In the area of privilege, however, these two bodies of law intersect.
Evidentiary privileges are unlike most other rules of evidence. While
rules of evidence are generally designed to elicit probative facts, evi-
dentiary privileges conceal these facts in order to protect interests the
state deems more important.16 Although a state's interest in eliciting
probative facts does not call for extraterritorial application of the general
rules of admissibility or exclusion of evidence, the protection of con-
fidences the state finds important may require such extraterritorial effect.
Likewise, a forum state's recognition or rejection of the privilege law
of another state may unduly limit or expand the legitimate scope of its
application.
The contemporaneous codification of these two major areas of Louis-
iana law presents a unique opportunity to address the proper scope of
evidentiary privileges, because the legislature is currently making the
fundamental policy decisions that must be considered in resolving this
issue. The policies behind the various privileges can be addressed before
the ephemeral legislative intent vanishes in the mists of time. These
simultaneous efforts also present a more basic question: Should the
problem be resolved by statute?"
The goal of this comment is to provide an analytical framework
for Louisiana lawyers, judges, and legislators who must confront this
problem. In the first section the background of the issue will be discussed
with emphasis on where the problem arises, constitutional implications,
and modern theories underlying choice of law. In the second section
evidentiary privileges"8 will be analyzed from the perspective of modern
15. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 138 (1971) [hereinafter Restatement
(Second)]; E. Scoles & P. Hay, Conflict of Laws § 12.10 (1982).
16. C. McCormick, McCormick on Evidence § 72, at 170-71 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
17. The American Law Institute chose to include a privilege rule in the Second
Conflicts Restatement. See Restatement (Second), supra note 15, § 139. For a discussion
of the operation of this section, see infra text accompanying notes 92-96.
18. This paper limits its discussion to those privileges termed "confidential com-
munication" privileges; that is, those arising from communications between persons. The
privilege against self-incrimination is not discussed. This privilege is compelled by the
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conflict of laws doctrine. This involves identification of both the policies
underlying the various privileges and the various states that are potentially
interested. With these states and their interests in mind, the third section
will consider how the issue should ultimately be resolved and will com-
pare solutions offered by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws,
an analogous article of the Louisiana conflicts draft, and the proposed
general article of the Louisiana conflicts draft. Finally, the advantages
and disadvantages of a statutory rule will be discussed, and a jurispru-
dential approach will be recommended.
THE PROBLEM IN CONTEXT
Where the Problem Arises
The simplest situation in which a state court must choose between
two states' laws of privilege arises when testimony is sought in the forum
state regarding a communication that occurred in another state.1 9 In this
situation, the witness may claim that the communication is privileged
in the state where it occurred, even though it would be subject to
disclosure if made in the forum state. The opposite situation may also
arise: a litigant may seek information that would be privileged in the
forum state, but is not privileged under the law of the state where the
communication was made. As discussed below, 20 the problem is not
confined to simply the forum state and the place of communication.
Other states may also be legitimately interested in the confidentiality or
disclosure of the communication. Other potentially interested states in-
clude the domiciles of the parties to the communication, the state where
the parties' relationship is centered, and the state whose substantive law
applies to the case.
Aside from testimony at trial, witnesses or litigants may invoke
foreign states' evidentiary privileges in two situations. The first of these
is the discovery deposition taken in a state other than that of the trial. 2'
In this case, in addition to those states listed above, the state of the
federal constitution, see U.S. Const. amend. V, and it is enforced fairly uniformly
throughout the country. Thus it poses no significant choice of law problems. See Sterk,
Testimonial Privileges: An Analysis of Horizontal Choice of Law Problems, 61 Minn. L.
Rev. 461, 463 n.8 (1977).
19. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McSwain, 149 Miss. 455, 115 So. 555
(1928); Davidson v. Great Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 737 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1987).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 82-88 for a discussion of the states potentially
interested in the resolution of the privilege issue.
21. See, e.g., Abety v. Abety, 10 N.J. Super. 287, 77 A.2d 291 (1950); Wexler v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 38 N.Y.S.2d 889 (City Ct. 1942).
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deposition may have an interest in the application of its law.22 The
second non-trial context for the assertion of a foreign privilege arises
when a subpoena duces tecum issues ordering the production of doc-
uments either made or stored in another state. Here again, a number
of states other than the forum are potentially interested. 23
The problem of conflicting laws of evidentiary privileges can arise
in both civil and criminal cases. Conflicts problems usually do not arise
in criminal cases, because the choice of law is determined by jurisdictional
principles. 24 Nevertheless, it is easy to posit a situation in which a witness
in a criminal case could invoke another state's privilege. While the fact
that the case involves the application of the forum's criminal law may
be a factor in favor of the application of forum law, the choice must
still be made. 25
The issue probably arises most frequently in federal courts sitting
in diversity. Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides in part,
"[In civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a
claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision,
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political sub-
division thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law."1
2 6
This rule's glaring omission is its failure to identify which state's law
applies to the claim of privilege. While the Supreme Court has yet to
address this issue, the lower federal courts have applied the reasoning
of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co. 27 and looked to
the conflicts rules of the state in which the federal court sits.2 s Under
22. Weinstein, Recognition in the United States of the Privileges of Another Juris-
diction, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 535, 536 (1956).
23. It is worth noting at this point that the author has found no reported Louisiana
decision confronting this issue. It undoubtedly arises in trial courts, however, and the
complete lack of guidance in Louisiana law regarding the proper resolution of the issue
probably prevents it from being assigned as error on appeal. It has arisen on appeal in
a number of other states, see supra cases cited in notes 19 & 21, and it is of constant
concern to federal courts in diversity cases under Fed. R. Evid. 501. See infra notes 26-
29 and accompanying text.
24. R. Cramton, D. Currie & H. Kay, Conflict of Laws, Cases-Comments-Questions
50 (4th ed. 1987).
25. In the few reported criminal cases where the question has arisen, courts have
uniformly refused to recognize foreign privileges. See Bussard v. State, 295 Ark. 72, 747
S.W.2d 71 (1988); People v. Carter, 34 Cal. App. 3d 748, 110 Cal. Rptr. 324 (1973).
26. Fed. R. Evid. 501.
27. 313 U.S. 487, 61 S. Ct. 1020 (1941).
28. See, e.g., Samuelson v. Susen, 576 F.2d 546 (3d Cir. 1978); Super Tire Eng'g
Co. v. Bandag Inc., 562 F. Supp. 439 (E.D. Pa. 1983). This approach follows that of
earlier cases that had characterized privilege law as "substantive" for the purposes of the
test of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938). These courts applied
the conflicts law of the forum state in accordance with Klaxon to determine the applicable
privilege law. See, e.g., Hyde Constr. Co. v. Koehring Co., 455 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1972).
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this analysis, a Louisiana conflicts rule assumes added importance; it
would delineate the scope of privileges not only in Louisiana courts,
but in federal courts sitting in diversity cases in Louisiana. 29
The Constitutional Limits on Choice of Law
The federal constitution limits a state court's freedom in choosing
the law to apply to a particular issue. In the past, the United States
Supreme Court has analyzed choice of law issues under both the full
faith and credit clause 0 and the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause. 3 In its more recent decisions, the Court has recognized the
applicability of both provisions while combining the two separate in-
quiries into a single test. In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,32 a plurality
of the Court stated:
In deciding constitutional choice-of-law questions, whether
under the Due Process Clause or the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, this Court has traditionally examined the contacts of
the State, whose law was applied, with the parties and with the
occurrence or transaction giving rise to the litigation. In order
to ensure that the choice of law is neither arbitrary nor fun-
damentally unfair, the Court has invalidated the choice of law
of a State which has had no significant contact or significant
aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, with the parties
and the occurrence or transaction.
The lesson from [the cases] is that for a State's substantive
law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that
State must have a significant contact or significant aggregation
of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law
is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.3
The Court most recently addressed the issue in Sun Oil Co. v.
Wortman.34 In that case, the Court upheld the application of the forum
29. This approach can, of course, lead to anomalous results when a reference to the
conflicts law of a particular state determines the rights of a person who has no relationship
whatsoever with that state. For an argument that the federal courts should instead conduct
a "center of gravity" analysis as a matter of federal law, see Kaminsky, State Evidentiary
Privileges in Federal Civil Litigation, 43 Fordham L. Rev. 923, 935-37 (1975).
30. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1; Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n,
306 U.S. 493, 504-05, 59 S. Ct. 629, 634 (1939).
31. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 407-08,
50 S. Ct. 338, 341 (1930).
32. 449 U.S. 302, 101 S. Ct. 633 (1981) (plurality opinion).
33. Id. at 308, 312-13, 101 S. Ct. at 637-38, 640 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.)
(footnotes and citations omitted).
34. 108 S. Ct. 2117 (1988).
1989]
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state's statute of limitations to claims where the forum's only connection
with the parties was by virtue of its status as forum for a class action
suit. The majority noted that statutes of limitations were historically
regarded as procedural rather than substantive, and thus reasoned that
neither the framers of the full faith and credit clause nor those of the
fourteenth amendment intended to limit the power of a state to apply
its own statute of limitations."
It is not clear whether Sun Oil has changed the law by substituting
a new "original intent" test in place of the "minimum significant
contacts" analysis set forth in Hague. While it is possible that the Court
will ultimately limit Sun Oil to statutes of limitations, it may be highly
important in the present context. Like statutes of limitations, the law
of privileges has traditionally been regarded as a part of the law of
evidence, and thus procedural in nature.16 Applying the original intent
analysis, any application of the forum's law of privileges could be
justified as conforming to the practice in the drafters' days. Even under
the Hague test, however, most choices of law will be constitutional. As
will be shown in the next section, modern choice of law methodologies
generally attempt to apply the law of the state with the most significant
interest in the particular issue. If this attempt is successful, then by
definition the "minimum significant contacts" test is met.
Modern Choice of Law Methodology
Proponents of modern choice of law theories generally call for the
examination of governmental interests in order to determine which law
applies to a particular issue in a particular litigation context. This requires
the court to determine the policies behind a particular rule of law. Once
these policies have been ascertained, the court then examines each state's
relationship to the issue in light of its policy objectives.37 While the
commentators fall into bitter disagreement over what should be done
next, the court must ultimately make a choice between the potentially
applicable rules.
The Louisiana conflicts draft steers a middle course between the
various competing approaches. Rather than becoming embroiled in ac-
ademic infighting, the drafters are attempting to establish a fair and
workable set of rules based on the general approach of governmental
policy analysis. Thus, to construct a rational choice of law analysis
35. Id. at 2123-26.
36. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McSwain, 149 Miss. 455, 115 So. 555,
557 (1928).
37. For detailed descriptions of the major modern approaches to conflicts problems,
see E. Scoles & P. Hay, supra note 15, §§ 2.6-2.17.
38. Symeonides, supra note 10, at 1033-34; Symeonides, Louisiana's Draft on Succes-
sions and Marital Property, 35 Am. J. Comp. L. 259, 285-90 (1987).
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that will complement the general conflicts articles, it is necessary to
identify both the policies that underlie the law of evidentiary privileges
and the states that are potentially interested in the application of their
law.
THE BASES OF A CHOICE OF LAW ANALYSIS: POLICIES AND PLACES
A state generally provides an evidentiary privilege to protect interests
and relationships that are regarded as more important than the avail-
ability of evidence in judicial proceedings.3 9 This general policy, however,
does not fully account for all evidentiary privileges. Force and Triche
have identified seven major confidential communication privileges in
Louisiana.10 These are the attorney-client,' husband-wife,' 2 physician-
patient,4 3 priest-penitent, 44 informant, 45 journalist, 46 and psychologist-
patient47 privileges. Although the precise rationales for these privileges
are rarely expressed within the statutes themselves,4 the variety of re-
lationships protected suggests that a number of discrete public policies
are at stake in the application or denial of specific privileges. Similarly,
the multitude of possible contacts with different states requires a qual-
itative examination of the possible contacts to determine which states
have policy interests at stake in these cases. 49 In assessing the importance
39. C. McCormick, supra note 16, § 72.
40. Force & Triche, supra note 9, at 734. In addition to these, there are a number
of other statutes granting various degrees of confidentiality to specific communications.
See, e.g., La. R.S. 37:87 (1989) (communications to accountants); La. R.S. 23:1660 (1985)
(employment records); La. R.S. 47:1508 (Supp. 1989) (tax records). The major areas of
privilege are sufficient for this illustration; practically speaking, other privileges implement
similar policies and can thus be analogized to one or more of the major privileges.
41. La. R.S. 13:3734.3 (Supp. 1988) (civil cases); La. R.S. 15:475 (1981) (criminal
cases). In addition to these general provisions, La. Code Civ. P. art. 1424 protects attorney
work product from discovery.
42. La. R.S. 15:461 (1981) (criminal cases). This statute establishes two separate
privileges: the privilege reserved to the defendant spouse as to private communications,
and the privilege that may be invoked by one called to testify against his spouse. Force
& Triche, supra note 9, at 735-36. Louisiana probably does not have a spousal privilege
for civil cases, see Force & Triche, supra note 9, at 734.
43. La. R.S. 13:3734 (Supp. 1989) (civil cases); La. R.S. 15:476 (1981) (criminal
cases).
44. La. R.S. 13:3734.1 (Supp. 1989) (civil cases); La. R.S. 15:477 (1981) (criminal
cases).
45. State v. Dotson, 260 La. 471, 256 So. 2d 594 (1971).
46. La. R.S. 45:1451-1458 (1982 & Supp. 1989).
47. La. R.S. 37:2363 (1988).
48. Reese & Leiwant, Testimonial Privileges and Conflict of Laws, 41 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 85, 87 (1977).
49. The Restatement (Second), and most commentators, refer to the potential ap-
plicability of only two states: the forum state and the state with the "most significant
19891
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of particular policies, careful analysis is required to determine the public's
precise interest in confidentiality. Obviously, this greatly complicates any
attempt to analyze evidentiary privileges as a class; however, it is nec-
essary to localize the possible interests at stake in disclosure. This section
will examine these individual policies, the privileges to which they apply,
and the states whose interests are potentially implicated.
Protection of the Communication
Perhaps the most often cited policy behind confidential communi-
cation privileges is the protection of communications thought desirable
by society.5 0 This is a part5 of the "utilitarian" view of privileges that
was strongly advocated by Dean Wigmore.5 2 Under this theory, a state
determines that the confidentiality of a particular type of communication
is more important than the full ascertainment of truth in litigation.
This policy underlies all of the confidential communication privileges
to some extent, but its importance varies from privilege to privilege.
For example, the public's strong interest in a free press and the avail-
ability of information seems to be the exclusive underpinning of the
journalist privilege. 3 The focus of the public interest is on the com-
munication itself; the public is interested in the relationship between a
journalist and his sources only to the extent communication occurs
between them. A similar situation exists with the informer privilege.
Again, society is not interested in the personal relationship between the
policeman and his source of information. Society's only interest is in
the actual transmission of information. 54
relationship to the communication." See Restatement (Second), supra note 15, § 139;
Sterk, supra note 18, at 475; Dunham, Testimonial Privileges in State and Federal Courts:
A Suggested Approach, 9 Willamette L.J. 26, 36-37 (1973). This limitation begs the
question of which state has the most significant relationship; presumably, that would be
determined in accordance with the general principles set forth in Restatement (Second) §
6. Some commentators have identified as a third potentially interested state, the state
whose substantive law is applicable to the merits of the action, see E. Scoles & P. Hay,
supra note 15, § 12.12; Reese & Leiwant, supra note 48, at 91-92, and one has identified
a fourth, see Weinstein, supra note 22, at 535-36. For a discussion of states potentially
interested in the application of their privilege law, see infra text accompanying notes 82-
88.
50. C. McCormick, supra note 16, § 72. See also Reese & Leiwant, supra note 48,
at 87, 89; Sterk, supra note 18, at 467; Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Con-
fusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 Tul. L. Rev. 101, 111 (1956); Weinstein,
supra note 22, at 536.
51. Dean Wigmore's analysis focuses on the protection of the communication in the
context of a relationship between the parties to the communication. This paper treats
protection of the communication and protection of the relationship between the parties
as analytically distinct. See infra text accompanying notes 58-59.
52. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2285 (McNaughton ed. 1961).
53. C. McCormick, supra note 16, § 76.2, at 184.
54. Id. § 111.
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On the other hand, protection of the communication is of only
marginal importance with other privileges. Some commentators have
asserted that the spousal privilege is not necessary for open communi-
cation between a husband and a wife. They reason that spouses will
choose to speak freely or not without reference to any immunity from
testifying. Thus this privilege must be primarily justified on other
grounds." Similarly, protection of the communication has only a mar-
ginal bearing on the priest-penitent privilege. A constitutionally secular
society has little interest in an individual's religious decision or obligation
to confess his sins.5 6
The remaining privileges fall in various places between these two
extremes. Given that protection of the communication is a policy un-
derlying most, if not all, confidential communication privileges, what
states are interested in protecting the communication? The most common
answer to this question is the state where the communication takes
place. 7 This is an acceptable conclusion in most cases, because that
state generally experiences most closely the effects of communications
within its borders. An informer, for example, generally deals with local
police, who then act upon the information in the immediate area. It is
easy, however, to posit a situation in which the situs of the commu-
nication has no interest whatsoever in the communication or its effects.
In the instance of the journalist who visits with his source while on
vacation in Florida and receives information regarding political corrup-
tion in their home state, the situs of the communication, Florida, ex-
periences no effect from the communication beyond a marginal increase
in the tourist trade. A more common problem is the interstate telephone
call. Here, it is impossible to determine where the communication is
made. Is it made in the state of the speaker, the state of the listener,
or somewhere between the two?
When protection of a communication is an important policy un-
derlying a privilege, the state that most closely experiences the favorable
effects of the communication is the state that is most interested in its
protection. Unfortunately, no hard and fast rule exists to determine
exactly which state this is in a given situation. A court may, however,
consider a fairly limited number of alternatives. These include the place
55. Id. § 86; Sterk, supra note 18, at 470-71.
56. C. McCormick, supra note 16, § 76.2.
57. See, e.g., Reese & Leiwant, supra note 48, at 92-93. See also Restatement (Second):
The state which has the most significant relationship with a communication will
usually be the state where a communication took place, which, as used in the
rule of this Section, is the state where an oral interchange between persons
occurred, where a written statement was received or where an inspection was
made of a person or thing.
Restatement (Second), supra note 15, § 139 comment (e).
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of the communication, the domiciles of the parties and the state where
the relationship is centered. From these alternatives, a court can generally
find the state with the most significant interest in the communication.
Protection of the Relationship
A public policy of protecting communications is commonly associated
with a policy of protecting certain favored relationships. 8 Dean Wig-
more's utilitarian analysis of evidentiary privileges combined these two
policies, emphasizing the symbiotic connection between the communi-
cation and the relationship. 9 Nevertheless, the two policies should be
considered analytically distinct. When the state protects the confiden-
tiality of a communication to facilitate the transmission of the substance
of the communication, it seeks to protect the communication. When
the state protects the confidentiality of a communication to facilitate
the maintenance of a socially desirable human relationship, it seeks to
protect the relationship.
The best examples of privileges that protect relationships are the
two spousal privileges. When the state determines that a wife need not
testify against her husband, the state is not only not seeking to encourage
the communication of incriminating evidence, it is forgoing its own
interest in discovering the substance of the communication. The purpose
is to provide an incremental degree of protection to the institution of
marriage. This is the reason that many states grant the defendant spouse
the opportunity to invoke his privilege against the spouse who wishes
to testify. The state is releasing substantively valuable evidence because
it finds distasteful the exploitation of a relationship the state encourages. 0
This policy also explains, at least partially, the attorney-client priv-
ilege. While the state is interested in the substance of the communications
between the attorney and his client-that is, the state wants the client
to be able to tell the attorney the truth-the state is also interested in
encouraging the relationship itself. This is a function of the adversary
system. Because the attorney is the client's advocate, the state desires
the parties to maintain a relationship that allows the highest possible
quality of 'representation. Quality representation of both sides in an
adversarial proceeding will then result in the courts doing justice in each
particular case. Thus the state provides the privilege to protect the
relationship of trust between the client and his attorney.6'
Other privileged relationships are encouraged primarily for the sub-
stance of the communication. The state has little interest in the personal
relations between a journalist and his source, or between a policeman
58. See supra authorities cited in note 50.
59. 8 Wigmore, supra note 52, § 2285.
60. C. McCormick, supra note 16, § 86; Louisell, supra note 50, at 111.
61. Sterk, supra note 18, at 468.
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and his informant. These relationships are neither desirable nor unde-
sirable, but they produce communications that advance the public good.
Thus they are protected for the sake of protecting the useful commu-
nications.
When a privilege protects a relationship, the state most interested
in the application of its law is the state where the relationship's perceived
beneficial effects are felt. The problem here, as with contracts, is one
of localization, that is, identifying the connecting factors most important
in determining the territorial situs of the relationship. 62 In the case of
the spousal privilege, this would be the matrimonial domicile if one
were ascertainable. Problems arise with interstate relationships. For ex-
ample, how does a court localize the relationship between a Louisiana
resident and his Texas lawyer? The answer may depend upon the scope
of the Texas lawyer's representation. Furthermore, it is conceivable that
the forum state, by virtue of its status as the forum, would be the state
most affected by a specific relationship between a nonresident attorney
and his nonresident client. Regardless, states with potential connections
to the relationship include the domiciles of the parties, the situs of the
communication, and the situs of the center of the relationship.
Protection of Privacy
A third justification for confidential communication privileges is the
protection of privacy. Advocates of this rationale argue that some re-
lationships, by their very nature, should be sacrosanct and free from
judicial interference. 63 While this argument is built around relationships,
the policy asserted is distinguishable from that of protecting relationships.
The protection of relationships is justified by the objective social good
achieved by maintenance of these relationships. The protection of pri-
vacy, on the other hand, is more subjective. Rather than considering
the beneficial aspects for society as a whole, the state, in granting a
privacy-based privilege, focuses on the benefit of the relationship and
its confidentiality to the individuals involved.
In contrast to the utilitarian analyses, the privacy-based rationale
has arisen relatively recently. Although one commentator in 1956 spoke
of "the right to be left by the state unmolested in certain human
relations," 64 the privacy argument did not gain currency until the late
1960s and early 1970s. Perhaps the most important factor in its rise to
prominence was the recognition of a constitutional right to privacy by
62. E. Scoles & P. Hay, supra note 15, §§ 3.6-3.7.
63. C. McCormick, supra note 16, § 72; Reese & Leiwant, supra note 48, at 88;
Sterk, supra note 18, at 467-68; Louisell, supra note 50, at 110-11.
64. Louisell, supra note 50, at 110.
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the United States Supreme Court.6 1 Since then, some state courts, in-
cluding the Louisiana Supreme Court, have intimated that certain priv-
ileges may be constitutionally compelled. 66
Protection of privacy is often cited as the policy behind the spousal
privileges, but it seems to primarily support the "professional" privileges,
such as physician-patient, psychologist-patient, and priest-penitent.67 These
professional relationships' effects on society at large are tenuous at best;
the only benefit received by society is that of having healthy citizens.
In contrast, the benefit to the individual is much more important. These
relationships often involve the communication of potentially embarrassing
information. Thus, in order to avoid intruding upon activity that is
beneficial to the individual involved, the state grants a degree of con-
fidentiality to the relationship.
On the other hand, some privileges do not protect any significant
privacy interests. The journalist's privilege promotes publicity, the an-
tithesis of privacy. While a source may desire anonymity, this desire is
arguably provoked by more practical considerations than the right to
be left alone. Similarly, the informant does not seek confidentiality as
protection from the encroachment of society; he seeks it as protection
from the encroachment of specific individuals.
Because privileges based upon privacy protect individuals rather than
relationships, the domicile or residence of the holder of the privilege is
the state primarily interested. The doctor, for instance, would not be
embarrassed by testifying to his diagnosis; his privacy is not at stake.
Therefore, the domicile of the other party to the protected relationship
is immaterial to this analysis, as are the places of the communication
and the center of the relationship. Another state with a potential interest,
however, is the state where the evidence will be disclosed, whether this
is the forum state, the state where the deposition is taken, or the state
where confidential documents are produced. Because the testimony will
be heard in that state, that state will be the situs of the intrusion upon
the privilege holder's privacy.
Protection of the Communicatee
The policies discussed above all protect, either directly or indirectly,
the person making the confidential communication. For instance, al-
.65. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965).
66. Arsenaux v. Arsenaux, 428 So. 2d 427, 430 (La. 1983), discussed in Pugh &
McClelland, Evidence, Developments in the Law, 1982-1983, 44 La. L. Rev. 335, 345-47
(1983) (holding physician-patient privilege not waived, citing La. Const. art. I, § 5 and
"strong constitutional considerations"). See also Roberts v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d
330, 107 Cal. Rptr. 309, 508 P.2d 309 (1973) (psychotherapist-patient privilege).
67. C. McCormick, supra note 16, § 72; Reese & Leiwant, supra note 48, at 88-89;
Sterk, supra note 18, at 470-73.
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though the informant privilege is designed to elicit useful information
from the informant, it does so by protecting the informant. Similarly,
the client in an attorney-client relationship is protected by the policies
that encourage the relationship to ensure procedural fairness.
One aspect of the confidential communication privileges that is often
overlooked, however, is the policy of protecting the person to whom
the information is communicated. This is accomplished in several ways.
First, in contravention of the principle that every man owes his evidence,
the confidential communicatee is absolved of the responsibility of tes-
tifying. This is a side effect of the exclusion of the evidence, but it
might also reflect the view that "it is unseemly for a man to divulge
what another was compelled to tell him by the nature of their rela-
tionship." 6 This attitude is partially a reformulation of the original
theory of the attorney-client privilege as being necessitated by the "oath
and honor" of the attorney. 69
A similar situation exists with regards to the journalist's privilege.
Because this privilege springs from the desirability of a free press, the
reporter is freed from being required to divulge his sources.70 This not
only frees the reporter from the courtroom, it enhances his ability to
gather news by allowing him to pledge confidentiality.
Another way in which privileges protect the communicatee is some-
what less noble. A privilege against testifying carries a certain profes-
sional cachet, and thus organized groups that wish to add to their
occupational prestige routinely seek to secure a privilege from the leg-
islature. This has led to a plethora of statutory privileges that have the
primary purpose of aggrandizing their holders.7
To the extent a privilege protects the holder of the confidence, rather
than the holder of the privilege, the primary state with an interest in
enforcing that protection would be the state of the communicatee's
domicile. Another potentially interested state is the state of disclosure,
because the communicatee will at least be present in that state at the
time of disclosure. The place of communication is irrelevant, as is the
place of the center of the parties' relationship, because these interests
are not implicated. Thus, if a purpose is the protection of the com-
municatee, the law of his domicile must be considered.
Prevention of Perjury
Another possible policy behind the granting of a confidential com-
munication privilege is the prevention of perjury. This is an accepted
68. Weinstein, supra note 22, at 536. See also Dunham, supra note 49, at 44 (naming
"the distaste courts have for the forced disclosure of information" as a potential policy
basis for the spousal privilege).
69. C. McCormick, supra note 16, § 87.
70. Id. § 76.2, at 185.
71. Id. § 75.
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justification of privileges in continental European systems. 72 The Eur-
opeans reason that if confidentiality is important to a witness, he may
perjure himself rather than reveal the truth of the communication. In
light of common law procedure's reliance upon cross examination to
reveal the truth, some have questioned the applicability of this policy. 73
Nevertheless, this policy seems to be at least partially behind a number
of privileges, particularly the spousal witness's privilege. If a court were
to find this applicable, the only interested state would be that where
the testimony was being taken, either the state of trial or the state of
the deposition.
Pursuit of Truth in Litigation
The final policy applicable to evidentiary privileges is the policy
advanced by a refusal to grant a privilege. By not granting a privilege,
a state makes a policy decision favoring the more complete ascertainment
of facts in litigation over claims to confidentiality. 74 The only state with
a true interest in not granting a privilege is the state that must find the
facts: the forum state. Any other states with contacts to the litigation
that deny privileges are, at best, disinterested, because the integrity of
their courts' fact-finding processes are not implicated.
Considerations of a Rational Choice of Law System
In addition to considering the policies applicable to the issue of
evidentiary privileges, it is also necessary to examine the policies behind
a rational choice of law system. These systemic considerations focus on
the choice of law approach's effects on the workings of the federal
system. For instance, comity might require a court to choose the law
of another state, even though its own state's law is potentially applicable,
out of deference to the strongly held policies of the sister state. 75 As
one commentator has argued, an unprincipled refusal to recognize other
states' privileges "fetters the operation of our multi-state system of
government" and "fosters a vindictive reciprocity. ' 76
There are two factors that must be considered in this context. The
first is any possible interest on the part of the state whose law is
applicable to the merits of the action. There is an intuitive appeal to
72. Louisell, supra note 50, at 109-10.
73. Reese & Leiwant, supra note 48, at 90.
74. C. McCormick, supra note 16, §§ 72, 73.2.
75. Seidelson, The Federal Rules of Evidence: Rule 501, Klaxon and the Constitution,
5 Hofstra L. Rev. 21, 51 (1976). In the nineteenth century, Justice Story theorized that
the sole reason for applying another state's law was comity. See E. Scoles & P. Hay,
supra note 15, § 2.4.
76. Dunham, supra note 49, at 47.
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this approach, especially since it would avoid depegage, the mixture of
applicable laws. A close examination, however, shows that the fact that
a state's substantive law applies, without more, does not justify the
application of its law to the collateral issue of privilege.7" A privilege
is invoked by a witness; he need not be a party. Thus, it is entirely
possible that the use of the applicable substantive law would subject
the witness to the law of a state he had never even visited. Unless there
is some other connection between the witness, the communication, the
protected relationship, or the forum, the fact that a particular state's
law applies to the merits is irrelevant.
The second factor, however, is more important. In considering the
law to apply to the claim of privilege, a court must determine whether
the parties to the communication legitimately relied upon any particular
state's law.78 Parties can be presumed to know of at least the major
privileges, such as attorney-client, husband-wife, and physician-patient.7 9
To the extent that privilege rules affect behavior, the parties could have
relied upon an expectation of confidentiality. Denying effect to that
expectation on a post hoc basis would be unjust. One respected com-
mentator has called reasonable reliance "the only feasible test" for
recognition of privileges. 0 Further, where one or more of the parties
is a citizen of the state whose law grants the privilege, that party has
a political stake in the application of a law that he at least marginally
approved through the democratic process."
CHOOSING THE LAW
Isolating the Interested States
One of the major problems of choosing the law to be applied is
determining which of a number of interested states is the one most
interested in the resolution of the issue. While many conflicts problems
offer relatively straight-forward choices between two states, the number
of potentially interested states in this context is equal to the number of
potentially significant contacts.
As a preliminary matter, it is safe to assume that the forum state
is always at least residually interested in the outcome of the issue. Even
when its primary interest is in the protection of its citizens, and it has
no citizens to protect, it still has a residual interest in ascertaining the
77. Reese & Leiwant, supra note 48, at 91-92.
78. A. Ehrenzweig, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws § 125, at 355-57 (1962);
Seidelson, supra note 75, at 33-34; Dunham, supra note 49, at 46-47.
79. Dunham, supra note 49, at 47.
80. A. Ehrenzweig, supra note 78, § 125, at 356.
81. Seidelson, supra note 75, at 34.
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truth in litigation in its courts. Thus the forum may always be considered
an interested state.
The problem is the ascertainment of the other most interested state.
The Restatement (Second), and most of the commentators, refer to the
state with "the most significant relationship with the communication.' '82
An immediate problem with this construction is its reference to the
communication. As discussed above, 3 in many instances the commu-
nication itself is irrelevant to the policy issues at stake. Thus a broader
scope is required.
At the same time, however, a narrower scope is needed. Assuming
that the state with the most significant relationship to the communication
is the other most interested state, a second problem is the determination
of this state. The comments to section 139 of the Restatement (Second)
offer little guidance beyond the suggestion that this state will generally
be the state where the communication occurs.84 This, of course, is often
not the case." Presumably, a court applying the Restatement approach
would revert to the general principles found in section 6.16 The problem
82. See Restatement (Second), supra note 15, § 139; E. Scoles & P. Hay, supra note
15, § 12.12; Reese & Leiwant, supra note 48, at 91-92; Sterk, supra note 18, at 475;
Dunham, supra note 49, at 36-37.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
84. Restatement (Second), supra note 15, § 139 comment (e). Section 139, the section
on testimonial privileges, provides:
(1) Evidence that is not privileged under the local law of the state which has
the most significant relationship with the communication will be admitted, even
though it would be privileged under the local law of the forum, unless the
admission of such evidence would be contrary to the strong public policy of
the forum.
(2) Evidence that is privileged under the local law of the state which has the
most significant relationship with the communication but which is not privileged
under the local law of the forum will be admitted unless there is some special
reason why the forum policy favoring admission should not be given effect.
Restatement (Second), supra note 15, § 139.
85. See supra text accompanying note 57.
86. Section 6 provides:
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive
of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the
applicable rule of law include (a) the needs of the interstate and international
systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other
interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination
of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic
policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and
uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the
law to be applied.
Restatement (Second), supra note 15, § 6.
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here is that, unlike the specific provisions governing tortss7 and con-
tracts,88 for example, section 139 provides no listing of significant con-
tacts to be considered in applying the general principles of section 6.
Thus each court facing the issue must undertake a de novo examination
of the relevant policies and the resulting significant contacts.
The selection of the other most interested state cannot be made
without looking to the policies underlying the specific privilege at issue.
Because these policies vary, contacts that are significant can be compiled.
These potential contacts include the place where the communication has
its greatest effect, the place where the relationship has its greatest effect,
the domicile of the parties, and the place where the evidence is disclosed,
if different from the forum. The court can then evaluate these contacts
qualitatively, in light of the underlying policies, rather than simply
counting contacts.
Analyzing the Competing Interests
Under traditional conflicts analysis, courts distinguished rules of
substance, which were controlled by the lex loci, from rules of procedure,
which were governed by the lex fori. 9 While this rule has been dis-
credited, the categories are still useful descriptions for issues that justify
looking outside for the applicable rule, as opposed to those that are
exclusively governed by the lex fori.
The substance/procedure distinction was suppressed largely because
of mischaracterization; courts had a tendency to apply their own law
87. After referring to the state with the most significant relationship under § 6, the
torts section provides:
Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine
the law applicable to an issue include: (a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicil,
residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties,
and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue.
Restatement (Second), supra note 15, § 145(2).
88. The contracts section refers to the state with the most significant relationship to
the transaction under § 6, and provides:
In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties (see § 187) the
contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine
the law applicable to an issue include: (a) the place of contracting, (b) the place
of negotiation of the contract, (c) the place of performance, (d) the location
of the subject matter of the contract, and (e) the domicil, residence, nationality,
place of incorporation and place of business of the parties. These contacts are
to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the par-
ticular issue.
Restatement (Second), supra note 15, § 188(2).
89. E. Scoles & P. Hay, supra note 15, § 3.8.
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by miscategorizing an issue as procedural. The characterization of evi-
dentiary privileges presents a similar opportunity to misconstrue the
function of the rule. This is because evidentiary privileges have both
substantive and procedural aspects. A state's granting of a privilege
involves a substantive policy decision. The state decides that the pro-
tection of a particular class of relationships, communications, or indi-
viduals is sufficiently important to warrant a certain sacrifice of judicial
efficiency and certainty. On the other hand, a state's refusal to grant
a privilege elevates procedural policies over the substantive protective
policies. The state in this instance decides that it prefers accuracy and
expediency in its judicial processes to the increased social protections
afforded by the privilege.
This distinction is important because it highlights a major difficulty
in choosing the applicable law of privilege. Without deciding which other
state's law could apply, there are two basic situations to consider. In
the first situation, Case A, the forum state F provides no privilege while
I, another interested state, does grant a privilege. In the second situation,
Case B, F provides a privilege while I does not.
An examination of Case A reveals that because F has provided no
privilege, it has made a procedural choice, in which F as the forum is
strongly interested. On the other hand, the interested state I, by providing
a privilege, has made a substantive choice in which it is strongly in-
terested. Thus, because the policy objectives of both F and I are affected
by the decision, this is a classic "true conflict." 9
Case B, however, is a different story. By providing a privilege, F
has substantively decided to forgo its court's factfinding abilities. If,
however, it is unconnected to the relationship, communication, or in-
dividual to be protected, then it obviously has no interest in providing
that protection. By denying a privilege, I has decided that factfinding
in its courts is more important than the incremental protection provided
by a privilege. Where /'s courts are not involved, however, this pro-
cedural policy is inoperative. Since neither state's policy choice would
be furthered by application of its law, this is the "unprovided-for case.''91
The privilege issue thus presents the two problems that governmental
interest analysis finds most intractable. In Case A, a choice must be
made between two potentially applicable rules, each of which serves an
interested state's legitimate policy objective. In contrast, Case B requires
a choice between two rules that will not further either state's policy
choices. To illustrate possible resolutions of this issue, the next sections
90. Id. § 2.6.
91. The "unprovided-for case" in interest analysis is that in which neither of two
competing states has an interest in the application of its law. See R. Cramton, D. Currie
& H. Kay, supra note 24, at 282-87.
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will consider the solutions offered by the Restatement (Second) and by
the Louisiana conflicts draft's treatment of the analogous situation of
prescription.
Restatement (Second) Section 139
The Restatement creates a rule of presumptive admissibility. 92 In
Case A, in which the forum denies the privilege while the other state
recognizes it, section 139 provides that the evidence shall be admissible
"unless there is some special reason why the forum policy favoring
admission should not be given effect." 93 The comments indicate that
the court, in deciding whether to recognize the foreign privilege, may
consider the forum's contacts with the parties and transaction, the relative
materiality of the evidence, the privilege involved, and fairness to the
parties .94
In Case B, where the forum recognizes the privilege but the other
state does not, the section provides that the evidence is admissible "unless
the admission of such evidence would be contrary to the strong public
policy of the forum." 9 The comments cite the general principle that
the forum should not exclude evidence not protected by the law of the
most interested states. Examples of situations where the evidence would
be excluded are those in which the forum has a substantial relationship
to the parties and the transaction, and those cases which involve privileges
representing a strong policy of the forum.9
The problem with these rules is the showing required to invoke the
privilege. Under either rule, the party seeking the protection of the
privilege must overcome a presumption against its application by making
a strong showing of the policy favoring exclusion. While this is under-
standable in Case A, in which the party would have to overcome the
interest of the forum state in applying its own law, it is a questionable
rule in Case B, where the policy of the forum favors the privilege
invoked over its residual interest in ascertaining the truth.
The Louisiana Conflicts Draft Article on Prescription
Prescription, like privilege, has both substantive and procedural as-
pects. Generally speaking, shorter prescriptive periods represent a pro-
cedural policy of avoiding stale claims and crowded dockets, while longer
prescriptive periods represent a substantive policy of favoring redress of
92. See supra note 84 for the text of § 139.
93. Restatement (Second), supra note 15, § 139(2).
94. Id. comment (d).
95. Id. § 139(1).
96. Id. comment (c).
19891
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
injuries. 97 Thus, in drafting the article on prescription, the Louisiana
State Law Institute has faced issues and interests similar to those asserted
here. 98
One major dissimilarity between prescription and privileges is pres-
cription's relationship to the law governing the merits of the action, the
lex causae. Thus the draft article's 99 initial determination that forum
prescription law applies whenever forum law applies to the merits has
no counterpart here.?° The second paragraph's treatment of the issue
when another state's law applies, however, does offer guidance in this
area.
• The second paragraph makes a major distinction between those
actions barred by prescription in this state and those not barred. These
cases are analogous to Case A and Case B, respectively, in that the
former situations represent a procedural policy while the latter implement
a substantive policy of the forum. When the action is barred by local
law, it will be dismissed unless it is not barred by the lex causae and
maintenance of the action is warranted by compelling considerations of
remedial justice. When the action is not barred by local law, it will be
maintained unless it is barred by the lex causae and maintenance is not
warranted by either the relationship of this state to the parties or
compelling considerations of remedial justice.
• Thus the draft prescription article solves the problem of mixed
substantive and procedural policies by creating a presumption in favor
of the application of local law. This is justified because in both instances
97. E. Scoles & P. Hay, supra note 15, §§ 3.9-3.12.
98. It should be noted that prescription does not offer the multitude of potential
policies at stake in privileges, nor does it present the number of potentially interested
states.
99. The proposed article provides:
When the substantive law of this state would be applicable to the merits of
an action brought in this state, the prescription and peremption law of this
state applies.
When the substantive law of another state would be applicable to the merits
of an action brought in this state, the prescription and peremption law of this
state applies, except as specified below:
(a) If the action is barred by prescription or peremption under the law of this
state, the action shall be dismissed unless: (1) the action would not be barred
in the state whose law would be applicable to the merits of the action; and (2)
maintenance of the action in this state is warranted by compelling considerations
of remedial justice.
(b) If the action is not barred by prescription or peremption under the law of
this state, the action shall be maintained, unless: (1) the action would be barred
in the state whose law is applicable to the merits of the action; and (2)
maintenance of the action in this state is not warranted by the policies of this
state and its relationship to the parties or the dispute nor by any compelling
considerations of remedial justice.
100. See supra text accompanying note 77.
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Louisiana has an interest in the action. If Louisiana is not interested,
then the article allows the applicability of foreign law.
The General Article of the Louisiana Conflicts Draft
The Law Institute has drafted a general and residual article intended
to apply to those situations in which there is no specific rule. 01 If
enacted, this article would provide the theoretical framework for any
resolution of the problem. Even if it is not passed, it offers the courts
guidance in determining the proper outcome.
The article begins with the principle that cases in which conflicts
arise are governed by the law of the state whose policies would be most
seriously impaired if its law were not applied. This is the general policy
behind the entire conflicts draft. The second paragraph goes on to
provide standards for the ascertainment of that state.
Applying this article to the privilege problem raises difficulties similar
to those with the Restatement (Second). The article speaks in broad
generalities and offers little guidance in determining which contacts are
legally significant. Furthermore, the article would lend little certainty to
this area, because it ultimately calls for a fact-intensive inquiry to be
undertaken on an ad hoc basis.
Nevertheless, the article is useful because it embodies a basic ap-
proach. While it leaves much to the judge's discretion, it does embody
a standard, that of the "most serious impairment," against which the
facts of a particular case can be measured. Perhaps most significantly,
it offers an approach that can be jurisprudentially adopted, even in the
absence of action on the part of the legislature.
STANDARDS FOR CHOOSING THE LAW OF PRIVILEGE
Is a Statute Needed?
Given the difficulties set forth above, and having found at least
general standards for the resolution of these choice of law issues, the
101. The proposed general and residual article provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this Title, cases having contacts with other
states are governed by the law of that state whose policies would be most
seriously impaired if its law were not applied to the particular issue.
That state is determined by:
(a) considering the policies embodied in the particular rules of law claimed to
be applicable as well as any other pertinent policies of the involved states; and
(b) evaluating the strength and pertinence of these policies in the light of: (1)
the relationship of each involved state to the parties and the dispute; and (2)
the policies and needs of the interstate and international systems, including the
policies of upholding the justified expectations of the parties and minimizing
the adverse consequences that might follow from subjecting the parties to the
law of more than one state.
Proposed Conflicts article 2.
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question now becomes whether a statutory rule is required. A statute
would clarify matters and offer some guidance to both state and federal
courts. Such a statute could conceivably make the law of privileges
more predictable, and it would help protect both the legitimate expec-
tations of nonresidents and Louisiana's interest in finding the facts in
its courts.
Despite these advantages, a statutory rule should not be enacted.
Because the area of privilege is so broad, any statute that comprehen-
sively covered the area would be unworkable. Conversely, a manageable
statute would be either too general to be helpful or too blunt to be
fair. In addition, it would provoke further cries for relief to already
overworked appellate courts. Finally, a statute would be an attempt to
fix what may not be broken. As has been noted, 02 this problem has
not been addressed in a Louisiana appellate decision. This may indicate
that it is not a problem, and tinkering with it invites trouble.
A Jurisprudential Approach
The same multitude of possible combinations that makes legislative
action unwise similarly makes it impossible to recommend any juris-
prudential "solution" that is anything more detailed than an approach.
Such an approach, however, should be clarified by the examination of
relevant policy considerations in this comment. Despite the complexity
of the field as a whole, choices can be made in individual cases by
simply following a standard choice of law approach, while paying at-
tention to the very specific policies underlying each privilege.
Any choice of law approach, whether statutory or jurisprudential,
must initially consider the policies behind the individual privileges. This
requires a closer scrutiny of privileges than is needed in most other
issues, because the distinctions are so fine. Next, there should be an
examination of both Louisiana law and that of any other potentially
interested state. This is a task uniquely suited to the judiciary. Once
the policies are isolated, the court has a method of ascertaining the
states with potential interests in the application or denial of the privilege.
This can be done by a qualitative, rather than quantitative, evaluation
of the relevant contacts.
Actually determining whether to apply a particular jurisdiction's rule
is more problematic. The approach of the prescription draft suggests
that in cases such as these a presumption in favor of Louisiana law
may be useful. In addition to protecting Louisiana's interest as the
forum, this would provide an easy and predictable resolution of those
cases that are too close to call. If such a presumption is necessary,
102. See supra note 23.
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however, it should be enacted by the legislature. In the absence of such
action, the diversity of the potential situations makes it impossible for
courts to formulate a rule of general applicability. Therefore, the courts
should undertake an extensive factual inquiry in every case and determine
the applicable law by reference to the policies discussed above and the
"most serious impairment" approach of the conflicts draft. This will
often involve choosing between two rules that are seemingly equally
applicable, but this is the essence of the judicial function.
CONCLUSION
Because it is simultaneously drafting both an evidence code and a
conflicts code, Louisiana has an unprecedented opportunity to clear the
cobwebs from a neglected area of intersection between the two areas
of law. Choice of law analysis of evidentiary privileges has long been
hampered by an imperfect understanding of the policies behind a leg-
islative grant of privilege. Through the Law Institute's drafting of the
new privileges section of the code of evidence, Louisiana courts can
undertake a considered analysis of those policies. This new understanding
will open the door to a modern analysis of the complex concerns
implicated by the extraterritorial invocation of evidentiary privileges.
Donald W. Price
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